Abstract. The square root modulo problem is a known primitive in designing an asymmetric cryptosystem. It was first attempted by Rabin. Decryption failure of the Rabin cryptosystem caused by the 4-to-1 decryption output is overcome efficiently in this work. The proposed scheme (known as the AA β -cryptosystem) has its encryption speed having a complexity order faster than the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange, El-Gammal, RSA and ECC. It can also transmit a larger data set securely when compared to existing asymmetric schemes. It has a simple mathematical structure. Thus, it would have low computational requirements and would enable communication devices with low computing power to deploy secure communication procedures efficiently.
Introduction
The Rabin cryptosystem that utilizes the square root modulo problem, is said to be an optimal implementation of RSA with the encryption exponent e = 2 [9] . However, the situation of a 4-to-1 mapping during decryption has deterred it from being utilized. Mechanisms to ensure its possible implementation have been proposed, however the solutions either still have a possibility of decryption failure or the performance against the RSA is inadequate. As a consequence other underlying cryptographic primitives have taken centre stage. The discrete log problem (DLP) and the elliptic curve discrete log problem (ECDLP) has been the source of security for cryptographic schemes such as the Diffie Hellman key exchange (DHKE) procedure, El-Gamal cryptosystem and elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) respectively [1] , [7] . As for the world renowned RSA cryptosystem, the inability to find the e-th root of the ciphertext C modulo N from the congruence relation C ≡ M e (mod N ) coupled with the inability to factor N = pq for large primes p and q is its fundamental source of security [10] . It has been suggested that the ECC is able to produce the same level of security as the RSA with shorter key length. Thus, ECC should be the preferred asymmetric cryptosystem when compared to RSA [15] . Hence, the notion "cryptographic efficiency" is conjured. That is, to produce an asymmetric cryptographic scheme that could produce security equivalent to a certain key length of the traditional RSA but utilizing shorter keys. However, in certain situations where a large block needs to be encrypted, RSA is the better option than ECC because ECC would need more computational effort to undergo such a task [12] . Thus, adding another characteristic toward the notion of "cryptographic efficiency"
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The research was supported by the Fundamental Research Grant Scheme #5523934 and Prototype Research Grant Scheme #5528100 Ministry of Higher Education, MALAYSIA.. which is it must be less "computational intensive" and be able to transmit large blocks of data (when needed). In 1998 the cryptographic scheme known as NTRU was proposed with better "cryptographic efficiency" relative to RSA and ECC [4] [5] [6] . NTRU has a complexity order of O(n 2 ) for both encryption and decryption as compared to DHKE, EL-Gammal, RSA and ECC (all have a complexity order of O(n 3 )). As such, in order to design a state-of-the-art public key mechanism, the following are characteristics that must be "ideally" achieved (apart from other well known security issues):
(1) Shorter key length. If possible shorter than ECC 160-bits.
(2) Speed. To have speed of complexity order O(n 2 ) for both encryption and decryption. (3) Able to increase data set to be transmitted asymmetrically. That is, not to be restricted in size because of the mathematical structure. (4) Simple mathematical structure for easy implementation. In this paper, we attempt to efficiently enhance an asymmetric cryptosystem based on the square root problem as its cryptogrpahic primitive. That is, we will efficiently redesign Rabin's cryptosytem that has decryption failure due to a 4-to-1 mapping. We will show that in our design for encryption, it does not involve "expensive" mathematical operation. Only basic multiplication is required without division or modulo operation.
The layout of this paper is as follows. The Rabin cryptosystem will be discussed in Section 2. Previous designs to overcome the decryption failure of the Rabin cryptosystem will also be presented here. The mechanism of the AA β -cryptosystem will be detailed in Section 3. In Section 4, the authors detail the decryption process and provide a proof of correctness. An example will also be presented. Continuing in Section 5, we will discuss a congruence attack, a Coppersmith type attack and a Euclidean division attack. An analysis of lattice based attack will be given in Section 6. Section 7 will be about the underlying security principles of the AA β scheme. A table of comparison between the AA β scheme against RSA,ECC and NTRU is given in Section 8. Finally, we shall conclude in Section 9.
The Rabin Cryptosystem
Let us begin by stating that the communication process is between A (Along) and B (Busu), where Busu is sending information to Along after encrypting the plaintext with Along's public key.
• Decryption by Along INPUT: The private key pair (p, q) and the ciphertext C. OUTPUT: The plaintext M .
Remark 2.2. Computing the square roots of C modulo N using the private keys (p, q), would result in 4 square roots of C modulo N . Thus, the "infamous" decryption failure scenario.
2.1. Redundancy Schemes for Unique Decryption. In order to overcome the decryption failure, it is necessary to have a scheme that could provide the plaintext upon decryption without having to guess. We provide here a brief description of 3 existing solution techniques.
(1) Redundancy in the message [8] . This scheme has a probability decryption failure of approximately
where l is the least significant binary string of the message.
(2) Extra bits [2] . One will send 2 extra bits of information to specify the square root. The encryption process requires the computation of the Jacobi symbol. This results in a computational overhead which is much more than just computing a single square modulo N .
(3) Williams technique [14] . The encryption process requires the encrypter to compute a Jacobi symbol. Hence, losing the performance advantage of Rabin over RSA (as in point no.2).
In the next section, we will present an efficient enhancement of Rabin's cryptosystem that does not inherit the above properties.
3. The AA β Public Key Cryptosystem
• Key Generation by Along
INPUT: The size n of the prime numbers. OUTPUT: A public key tuple (n, e A1 , e A2 ) and a private key pair (pq, d).
(1) Generate two random and distinct n-bit strong primes p and q satisfying
Choose random integer e such that ed ≡ 1(mod pq) and add multiples of pq until 2 3n+4 < e < 2 3n+6 (if necessary). (4) Set e A1 = p 2 q. We have 2 3n < e A1 < 2 3n+3 . (5) Set e A2 = e. (6) Return the public key tuple (n, e A1 , e A2 ) and a private key pair (pq, d).
We also have the fact that 2 2n < pq < 2 2n+2 .
• Encryption by Busu
The public key tuple (n, e A1 , e A2 ) and the message M.
OUTPUT: The ciphertext C.
(1) Represent the message M as a 4n-bit integer m within the interval (2 4n−1 , 2 4n ) with m = m 1 · 2 n + m 2 where m 1 is a 3n + 1-bit integer within the interval (2 3n , 2 3n+1 ) and m 2 is a n − 1-bit integer within the interval (2 n−2 , 2 n−1 ). (2) Choose a random n-bit integer k 1 within the interval (2 n−1 , 2 n ) and com-
Choose a random n-bit integer k 2 within the interval (2 n−1 , 2 n ) and compute and compute ( We now proceed to give a proof of correctness.
Along will begin by computing W ≡ Cd ≡ V 2 (mod pq). Along will then have to solve W ≡ V 2 (mod pq) using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Lemma 4.2. Let p and q be two different primes such that p ≡ 3(mod 4) and q ≡ 3(mod 4). Define x p and x q by
4 (mod q). Then the solutions of the equation x 2 ≡ W (mod p) are ±x p (mod p) and the solutions of the equation x 2 ≡ W (mod q) are ±x q (mod q).
Lemma 4.3. Let p and q be two different primes such that p ≡ 3(mod 4) and q ≡ 3(mod 4). Define x p and x q by
. Then the solutions of the equation
To solve the equation V 2 ≡ W (mod pq), we use the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Consider the equations x 
We will get explicitly
. It can be seen that solving V 2 ≡ W (mod pq), we will get four solutions V i for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.
We prove below that only one of them leads to the correct decryption and consequently, there is no decryption failure. Proof. Suppose for contradiction that there are two couples of solutions (U 1 , V 1 ) and (U 2 , V 2 ) of the equation C = U e A1 + V 2 e A2 with V 1 = V 2 and V i < 2 2n−1 .
. Using e A1 = p 2 q, this leads to
Since gcd(p 2 q, e A2 ) = 1, then p 2 q|(V 1 + V 2 )(V 1 − V 2 ) and the prime numbers p and q satisfy one of the conditions
Observe that p 2 > 2 2n and pq > 2 2n while |V 1 ± V 2 | < 2 · 2 2n−1 = 2 2n . This implies that none of these conditions is possible. Hence the equation C = U e A1 + V 2 e A2 has only one solution with the parameters of the scheme 4.1. Example. Let n = 16. Along will choose the primes p = 62683 and q = 62483. The public keys will be (1) e A1 = 245505609868187 (2) e A2 = 4106878163802480 The private keys will be will produce an integer value. That is U 3 = 35693832703611425953. Finally, m 1 and m 2 can be obtained.
Basic Attacks

Congruence attack.
In this subsection we will observe the security of the ciphertext equation C = U e A1 + V 2 e A2 when it is treated as a Diophantine equation. We will observe that solving the corresponding Diophantine equation parametric solution set for the unknown parameters U and V 2 will result in exponentially many candidates to choose from.
From C = U e A1 + V 2 e A2 and since gcd(e A1 , e A2 ) = 1 we have
A1 ≡ a (mod e A2 ). Hence U = a + e A2 j for some j ∈ Z. Replacing into C we have
Then,
where C−eA1a eA2
= b ∈ Z. It follows that the equation C = U e A1 + V 2 e A2 has the parametric solutions U = a + e A2 j and V 2 = b − e A1 j.
• Computing with U To find U = a + e A2 j, we should find an integer j such that 2 4n < U < 2 4n+1 . This
We know that 2 3n+4 < e A2 < 2 3n+6 . Then the difference between the upper and the lower bound is
Hence the difference is very large and finding the correct j is infeasible.
• Computing with V
2
To find V 2 = b − e A1 j, we should find an integer j such that 2 4n−4 < V < 2 4n−2 . This gives
We know that 2 3n < e A1 < 2 3n+3 . Then the difference between the upper and the lower bound is 2
5.2.
Coppersmith type attack. • Attacking V With reference to Theorem 1. Let N = e A1 = p 2 q and d
, this attack is infeasible.
• Attacking d
With reference to Theorem 2. We begin by observing f b (x) = ex − 1 ≡ 0(mod pq) where pq in an unknown factor of N = e A1 = p 2 q. Since pq > N 2 3 we have β = 5.3. Euclidean division attack. From C = U e A1 +V 2 e A2 , the size of each public parameter within C ensures that Euclidean division attacks does not occur. This can be easily deduced as follows:
Analysis on lattice based attack
The square lattice attack has been an efficient and effective means of attack upon schemes that are designed based on Diophantine equations. The AA β scheme has gone through analysis regarding lattice attacks while it went through the design process. Let C = U e A1 + V 2 e A2 be an AA β ciphertext. Consider the diophantine equation e A1 x 1 + e A2 x 2 = C. Introduce the unknown x 3 and consider the diophantine equation
is a solution of the equation. Next let T be a number to fixed later. Consider the lattice L spanned by the matrix:
This shows that the lattice L contains the vectors (x 1 , x 2 , T (e A1 x 1 + e A2 x 2 − Cx 3 )) and more precisely the vector-solution V 0 = (U, V 2 , 0). Observe that the length of
On the other hand, the determinant of the lattice is det(L) = CT and the Gaussian heuristics for the lattice L asserts that the length of its shortest non-zero vector is usually approximately σ(L) where
If we choose T such that σ(L) > V 0 , then V 0 can be among the short non-zero vectors of the lattice L. To this end, T should satisfy 
.., 4 and n = 3.
which follows from the lower bound of equation (3). We experimented this result to try to find (U, V 2 , 0). The LLL algorithm outputs a basis with a matrix in the form
. We then deduce the system
from which we can deduce that x 3 = 0. If we compute (U e A1 − V 2 e A2 )/C, we get x 2 = 1 for some x 1 . It follows that
This situation is similar to the congruence attack. We can also observe that this is a system of two equations with three unknowns (i.e. x 1 , U, V ).
6.1. Example with lattice based attack. We will use the parameters in the earlier example. Observe the lattice L spanned by the matrix: Underlying security principles 7.1. The integer factorization problem. To find the unknown composite p and q such that e A1 = p 2 q.
7.2. The square root modulo problem. Since gcd(e A1 , e A2 ) = 1, one can obtain the relation V 2 ≡ α(mod e A1 ). Since e A1 = p 2 q, then this is equivalent to calculating square roots modulo composite integers with unknown factorization which is infeasible.
7.3. The modular reduction problem. Since gcd(e A1 , e A2 ) = 1, one can obtain U ≡ β(mod e A2 ). Since U ≫ e A2 , to compute U prior to modular reduction by e A2 is infeasible.
7.4. Equivalence with integer factorization. From C = U e A1 +V 2 e A2 we have
where e A1 = p 2 q is of unknown factorization. We show here that solving this congruence relation is equivalent to factoring e A1 . If we know the factorization of e A1 , then it is easy to solve the congruence relation. Conversely, suppose that we know all the solutions. By Lemma 2, the four solutions are
and are such that V i < pq for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. We will now have V 1 +V 3 = 2x q M 2 p+αpq for some integer α. Then V 1 + V 3 ≡ 0(mod p). On the other hand,
Hence q = p 2 q p 2 .
Table of Comparison
The following is a table of comparison between RSA, ECC, NTRU and AA β . Let |E| denote public key size. The AA β cryptosystem has the ability to encrypt large data sets (i.e. 4n-bits of data per transmission). The ratio of M : |E| suggests better economical value per public key bit being used. For the decryption process off the AA β scheme, the value of k stated in its complexity is a "small" constant. Empirical evidence for length n = 512 (i.e. the length of the prime is 512 bits) which would result in total public key length to be 6n = 3072 bits, when decrypting
Conclusion
The asymmetric scheme presented in this paper provides a secure avenue for implementors who need to transmit up to 4n-bits of data per transmission. With an expansion rate of 1 : 1.75 the ciphertext to be transmitted is not much more larger than the ratio of the ECC. Eventhough its expansion rate is larger than RSA, this is only natural since it is transmitting a larger data set. This will give a significant contribution in a niche area for implementation of asymmetric type security in transmitting large data sets.
The scheme is also comparable to the Rabin cryptosystem with the advantage of having a unique decryption result. It has achieved an encryption and decryption speed with complexity order of O(n 2 ) and it also has a simple mathematical structure for easy implementation.
